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Abstract
The Great Recession had the most severe impact on state tax revenues of any
downturn since the Great Depression. We hypothesize that states with more
progressive tax structures are more vulnerable to economic downturns, and that
progressivity and income volatility may interact to amplify the recession’s fiscal
impact. We find that, while potential revenue exposure is greater in more progressive
states, the most important source of variation was differences in income concentration
and capital gains shares in the top 5 percent of taxpayers. Though the interaction
between income volatility and high tax burdens at the top did produce large decreases
in tax revenue in a few states, tax progressivity accounted for little of the overall
interstate variation in revenue volatility.
JEL codes: H24; H71
Keywords: Tax volatility; Tax progressivity; Income distribution; Capital gains

Introduction
Stability of revenues is an important feature of sub-national revenue systems. Because
spending obligations generally increase in recessions, and states and localities are sharply
constrained in their ability to run deficits, the greater the volatility of revenues over the
business cycle, the greater the pressure to cut spending and raise taxes during recessions,
and the greater the incentive to expand spending commitments and cut taxes during recovery. Such instability reinforces the pro-cyclical impact of state and local budgets.
The two most important types of taxation used by U.S. states are taxes on consumption and personal income. In 2007, 49 percent of state tax revenues came from consumption taxes, and 32 percent from income taxes. The conventional wisdom is that
consumption is more stable than income through the business cycle, implying that
taxes on consumption are likely to be less volatile than taxes on income. However,
consumption taxes are also widely assumed to be more regressive than income taxes,
though incidence varies depending on the specific bases and rate structures and the
time period of analysis (Institute for Taxation and Economic Policy 2009; Chernick
and Reschovsky 1997). If these assumptions are correct, states face a potential tradeoff
between vertical equity and revenue stability.
The Great Recession of 2007–2009 provides an important test case to examine the
equity-stability tradeoff. This recession precipitated the sharpest decline in state tax
revenues in the post-war period. Between fiscal years 2007 and 2010 nominal tax
© 2014 Chernick et al.; licensee Springer. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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revenues declined by 7.6 percent. It was only in 2011, four years after the onset of the
recession, that state taxes regained their prior nominal peak1. Though partially offset
by increased federal aid, revenue reductions led to sharp decreases in state employment
and state aid to local governments2. However, despite the depth of the aggregate
decline, variation across states was considerable. Of the 48 contiguous states, 36 experienced nominal declines in state tax revenue, while 12 had increases3.
While the business cycle would be expected to exert an important influence on state
tax revenues, the exceptionally large decline in revenues in the Great Recession, as well
as in the 2001 recession, suggests that recession-related volatility may have increased
over time. A potential source of increased volatility, both for federal and state tax revenues, is the secular increase in income concentration and capital gains receipt in the
United States4. Because the share of income from capital gains rises with the level of
income, increased income concentration has been accompanied by increased concentration of income from capital gains5. Given that capital gains are closely tied to the
value of stock shares, and stock prices are more volatile than ordinary income, income
from capital gains tends to be more cyclically volatile than ordinary income. This
implies that incomes at the top of the distribution will be more cyclically sensitive than
average income6. Increasing volatility of the tax base may in turn increase the sensitivity
of state tax revenues to the business cycle. Moreover, volatility may be magnified in states
with more progressive tax structures, as bigger changes in the tax base at the top end are
amplified by higher tax rates applied to that income.
In this paper, we use the Great Recession as a test case to address the effect on state
tax revenues of income concentration, capital gains receipt, and tax progressivity. Were
the sharper drops in state tax revenues experienced in a number of states due mainly
to greater income inequality, more capital gains receipt, and differences in state tax
structure, or was the overall severity of the Great Recession the dominant force?
We first sort out the impacts on state tax revenue of shocks to income in different
parts of the income distribution, tax burdens at those income levels, and the overall tax
burden. We develop and implement the concept of "potential revenue exposure"; that
is, the predicted change in revenue due to an income shock, given the state's tax structure, in the absence of policy offsets such as changes in tax rates. We use this concept
to simulate the effect on revenue exposure of alternative counterfactual assumptions
about income shocks, tax progressivity, and average tax rates. We then estimate regression models to investigate how the concentration of income and capital gains contributed to the shocks to income in the upper part of the income distribution, and to
analyze the effects of tax progressivity versus income shocks on state tax revenues.
While other papers have examined the role of base volatility and tax structure, our
paper is the first to take systematic account of interstate differences in base volatility by
income concentration and capital gains receipt, and the interaction between differential
volatility and the distribution of state tax burdens by income level.
Our principal finding is that, while potential revenue exposure is greater in more progressive states, the most important source of interstate variation in revenue exposure in
the Great Recession was not state tax structure, but differences in the importance of
income concentration and capital gains income, as well as the state-specific severity of
the recession. At the top end of the income distribution the interaction between sharp
drops in income and high tax burdens can produce large decreases in tax revenue.
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However, tax progressivity accounts for very little of the overall interstate variation in
revenue volatility during the 2007–2009 recession. At present these conclusions apply
only to the most recent recession. However, our methodology could be readily applied
to previous recessions, to determine whether the results generalize to other businesscycle induced fluctuations in state tax revenues.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 contains a brief literature review.
Section 2 discusses the roles of income concentration, capital gains, and tax progressivity in revenue volatility. Section 3 presents the conceptual basis for calculating revenue
exposure, the implementation of this concept for state taxes, and the comparison of
revenue exposure to both the actual change in taxes and to counterfactual measures
that remove the interstate variation in one factor at a time. Section 4 analyzes the
change in the tax base, with a focus on changes in top-quintile AGI, while Section 5
analyzes actual revenue changes as a function of tax structure and changes in the tax
base. Section 6 concludes.
1. Literature review

Prior research on state tax volatility has used panel data to estimate separate revenue
elasticities for the major state taxes, attempting to distinguish between short- and longrun elasticities. Holcombe and Sobel (1996), using the period 1972–1993, find similar
short-run elasticities with respect to personal income for the sales tax (1.3) and the
income tax (1.4). In a recent summary of the literature, Dye (2004) emphasizes that both
base and revenue elasticities with respect to changes in income differ across states.
Dye and McGuire (1991) take the personal consumption series from the National
Income and Product Accounts and income changes by income class from the Current
Population Survey to provide national estimates of changes in the sales and income tax
bases over a 20-year period. These series are used to estimate national average responses of state sales and income tax revenues to the business cycle. Their income
measure excludes capital gains, and does not take account of variation across states in
the cyclicality of tax bases. They simulate the variability across states of state taxes
under both broad and narrow sales tax bases, and both flat and highly progressive
income tax structures. They find greater variability of the income tax under the progressive structure. Putting the sales and income tax results together, they conclude that
state tax structure has an important impact on volatility. However, in his 2004 paper,
Dye suggests that changing the mix of taxes would on average have little effect on state
tax volatility. Bruce et al. (2006) find that the average long-run elasticity for income
taxes is more than double that for sales taxes, but neither tax is universally more volatile. In contrast to Dye (2004), Seegert (2012) concludes that most of the increase in
state tax volatility in the 2000’s can be attributed to imbalance in state tax structures,
defined as overweighting either sales or income taxes. None of the studies cited take
into account differences across states in the elasticity of the tax base by income level.
2. Income distribution and tax structure
A. Income inequality and capital gains

Within the widely noted national increase in income inequality, there is considerable
variation across states. In the state at the 90th percentile of income inequality (as measured
by the share of a state’s total adjusted gross income [AGI] received by the top 5 percent of
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taxpayers), the top 5 percent of taxpayers received 42 percent of total AGI in 2007,
compared to 29.5 percent in the state at the 10th percentile.
The sharp drop in top incomes in the 2007–2009 recession was largely due to the
importance of capital gains in the income of top taxpayers and the cyclical volatility of
realized capital gains. Aggregate capital gains realizations declined by 95 percent between 2007 and 2009, from $913 billion to $48 billion7. In contrast, total AGI declined
12.2 percent over this period ($1.06 trillion), while personal consumption expenditures
declined 1.9 percent (Internal Revenue Service various years; U.S. Dept of Commerce).
Thus capital gains, though constituting only 10.5 percent of AGI in 2007, accounted
for more than 80 percent of the total decline.
Capital gains income is highly concentrated in a relatively small number of tax
returns. In 2007, over 80 percent of all capital gains were realized by the top 5 percent
of taxpayers, of which about 38 percent were realized by the top one tenth of one
percent of taxpayers (Lurie and Pearce 2012). While the share of capital gains realized
by the top 5 percent of returns has remained relatively constant over time, the share of
the top one tenth of one percent has both increased over time and fluctuated more
during recessions. Of the 41 states with broad-based income taxes, 33 tax capital gains
income at ordinary income tax rates, while 8 offer special tax breaks (Institute for
Taxation and Economic Policy 2011). Hence, most capital gains income is taxed at the
highest state marginal tax rate.
Given the volatility of capital gains income, a key point is that capital gains income
varies in importance across states. Among the top 5 percent of filers in a state, the
mean share of AGI from capital gains realizations in 2007 was 21 percent, but it ranged
from 13 percent in West Virginia to 39 percent in Wyoming8. If finer breakdowns were
available, they would undoubtedly show even greater variation across states in the
capital gains share for the top one percent or higher of a state’s income distribution.
B. State tax progressivity

The progressivity of state tax systems also varies substantially across states. The tax
burden for a given slice of the income distribution is defined as the sum of state and
local taxes ultimately paid by a family with income equal to the average for that slice,
divided by that average income9. Drawing on multiple years of data from the Institute
for Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP) of the Citizens for Tax Justice and other studies, Chernick (2005) shows that progressivity, defined as the ratio of the burdens on the
top 5 percent of families to the bottom 20 percent, ranges across states by almost three
to one. In 2007, according to the ITEP model, the burden on the top 5 percent of the
income distribution ranged from 2.3 percent to 10.1 percent. Among the next 15 percent of taxpayers, the range was 4.5 percent to 12.7 percent10. This variation, largely
derived from differences in state income taxation, is potentially large enough to induce
substantial variation in revenue impacts across states, from a given economic shock at
the top end of the income distribution11.
3. Revenue exposure
A. Conceptual approach

The traditional approach to explaining volatility is to model overall changes in tax revenues
over time as a function of the changes in the tax base for each individual tax – individual
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income tax, general and selective sales taxes, the corporation income tax and in a few states
severance taxes – and the policy offsets which are imposed (Dye and McGuire 1991; Dye
2004). In contrast, we focus on the effects of differences in state income distributions,
capital gains receipt, and state tax progressivity in a particular recession, with special attention to the top of the income distribution.
The change in tax revenue from an economic downturn can be decomposed as follows:




ΔTax Revenuej ¼ ∑q ΔBaseqj ⋅ Rateqj þ Baseqj ⋅ ΔRateqj þ ΔBaseqj ⋅ ΔRateqj
ð1Þ
where q indexes slices of the income distribution, while j indexes states. The base
changes in (1) may be divided into a recession component and a policy offset:
ΔBaseqj ¼ ΔBaseqj ; recession þ ΔBaseqj ; policy

ð2Þ

The first term in (2) is the change in the tax base due to the recession, with policy
unchanged. A state’s revenue exposure is defined as

ð3Þ
Revenue Exposurej ¼ ∑q ΔBaseqj ; recession ⋅ Rateqj
Recession-related changes in tax bases may be offset (or reinforced) by policy
changes, which can affect both bases and rates. For example, states might expand the
sales tax base, or raise marginal income tax rates12. The policy offset is equal to



Revenue Offsetj ; policy ¼ ∑q ΔBaseqj ; policy ⋅ Rateqj þ Baseqj þ ΔBaseqj ⋅ ΔRateqj
ð4Þ
Note that “offset” includes all revenue generated by tax rate changes, applied to both the
original tax base plus recession-related base changes, plus policy-related base changes
applied to the original tax rates. Hence, the change in revenue may be rewritten as
ΔTax Revenuej ¼ ð3Þ þ ð4Þ ¼ Revenue Exposurej þ Revenue Offsetj ; policy

ð5Þ

B. Empirical measure of revenue exposure

To assess the fiscal effect of the recession via changes in the income distribution, we
measure exposure as the product of the change in income by income segment and the
state-specific tax burden on that segment. Based on available IRS data and our focus on
the effect of income changes at the high end of the income distribution, families are divided into three income segments: the top 5 percent of tax filers, the next 15 percent, and
the bottom 80 percent. To make large and small states comparable in scale, we divide by
the number of federal income tax returns in 2007. The potential change in aggregate tax
revenue per return equals the weighted average of the potential revenue change per return
by income segment, where the weights are the shares of tax returns in each segment.
Our measure of revenue exposure for state j, computed for the years 2007–2009, is
given by



ð6Þ
Revenue Exposurej ¼ ∑q¼1;3 t07qj ⋅ ΔBase07−09qj ⋅ ShareReturnsqj
In expression (6), the subscript q denotes the segment of the income distribution
and j denotes the state. The rate t07q represents the effective tax burden on segment
q in 2007, ΔBase07-09q is the change in AGI in segment q from 2007 to 2009, and
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ShareReturnsq is the share of federal tax returns in segment q. The empirical implementation of (6) is given by




Revenue Exposurej ¼ :05 t07top5;j =t07avg;j ⋅ ΔAGI07−09top5;j =Ret07top5;j



þ :15 t07nxt15;j =t07avg;j ⋅ ΔAGI07−09nxt15;j =; Ret07nxt15;j



þ:80 t07nxt80;j =t07avg;j ⋅ ΔAGI07−09nxt80;j =Ret07nxt80;j g ⋅ t07avg;j
ð7Þ
Ret07qj is the number of federal tax filers in segment q of the AGI distribution in state
j in 2007. The average tax burden t07avg,j in (7) is the income share-weighted sum of
the tax burdens; i.e.,


ð8Þ
t07avg;j ¼ ∑q¼1;3 t07qj ⋅ AGI07qj =Total AGI07j
The average tax burden t07avg,j may be thought of as representing the state’s preferences for public services, while the progressivity measure, t07qj/t07avg,j, measures the
state’s distributional preferences. We retain t07avg,j in (7), even though it could be cancelled out of the equation, because it allows us to distinguish changes in progressivity
from changes in the average tax burden in the simulations which follow.
C. Construction of tax and income variables

Effective tax burdens t by income quintile are produced by the 50-state tax incidence
model from the Institute for Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP 2009)13. The model
assigns taxes to families based on patterns of income and consumption. Changes in the
tax base by income level within a state are measured by the 2007–2009 change in adjusted gross income (AGI) for that slice of the income distribution. The data source for
AGI and number of tax returns by state is the published IRS Statistics of Income data
by AGI bracket. We interpolated, as described below, to estimate AGI for the top 5,
next 15, and bottom 80 percent of returns.
The ITEP measures tax burdens by simulating taxes paid based on the structure of
state income taxes, the rates and coverage of general and specific sales taxes, and rates
of the corporation income tax. Income taxes are assumed to be borne by taxpayers,
while consumption taxes are mainly shifted forward to consumers. State corporate income taxes are assumed to be borne mainly by capital within the state, with some portion exported to residents of other states. The ITEP measures do not take account of
taxes imported into or exported from a state14. Given the small amount of revenue
most states raise from the corporation income tax, estimated tax burdens for the high
end of the state’s income distribution are largely a function of the structure of the personal income tax, including the top marginal rate, bracket widths, and the tax treatment of capital gains. Consumption tax burdens are assigned according to spending
patterns by income class for taxed items, using the Consumer Expenditure Survey.
In addition to the tax burden estimates, the ITEP data also provide estimates of average family income by income-distribution slice by state for 2007. The slices are the first
four quintiles, the next fifteen percent, the next four percent, and the top one percent.
In contrast, the published IRS data provide AGI, realized capital gains income, and
number of returns by AGI bracket, state, and year. The brackets are (in thousands): less
than $50, $50-$75, $75-$100, $100-$200, $200 and above. To combine the IRS data on
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changes in income with the ITEP data on tax burdens, we need to express the IRS data
in terms of percentiles. Given the share of returns that is in each AGI bracket, we use
linear interpolation to assign a percentage of the AGI and capital gains amounts within
each bracket to the respective percentiles15. However, we could not estimate AGI or
capital gains amounts for the top one percent, because the open-ended top AGI
bracket contains more than one percent of the returns in every state. A disproportionate share of the income and capital gains in this bracket belong to the top one percent,
but we have no way of estimating what that share is, on a state-by-state basis. Given
the particular importance of the top end of the income distribution for revenue
changes, we therefore decided to collapse the ITEP data into three slices; the top 5 percent, the next 15 percent, and the bottom 80 percent16.
Summary statistics and data sources for the components of revenue exposure, including tax burdens and changes in AGI by income slice, are given in Table 1. The table
also includes summary data for variables used in the subsequent regression analysis of
changes in AGI by slice of the income distribution, including capital gains shares and
income shares, and changes in state tax revenues.
D. Results of the fiscal exposure analysis

Table 2 compares potential revenue exposure and change in actual revenue, for all
states and for selected subsets17. (Hereafter, “revenue” refers to tax revenue, for the
sake of brevity.) The table also shows tax progressivity (row 7), as measured by the
ratio of the burden on the top 5 percent to the average burden. Column (1) highlights
the wide range in the effect of the Great Recession on state tax revenues. While the
mean change in state tax revenue per return was a drop of $138, the standard deviation
($582) is more than four times as large. The average percentage decline (row 3) was 3.1
percent, with a standard deviation (10.3) over three times as large as the mean18.

Table 1 Summary statistics of relevant variables (N = 48)
Variable

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

Change in total state tax revenue 2007–2009, per 2007 return1,3

−138

582

−1,128

2,596

Potential revenue exposure2

−255

215

−874

214

−83,774

46,787

−237,197

−10,729

−5,257

2,857

−11,571

5,633

3

Change in AGI per return in top 5% of returns, 2007-2009

Change in AGI per return in next 15% of returns, 2007-20093
Change in AGI per return in bottom 80% of returns, 2007-2009

1,108

787

−821

2,938

Total state tax burden on top 5%, 20074

0.066

0.019

0.023

0.101

Total state tax burden on next 15%, 2007

0.085

0.016

0.045

0.127

Total state tax burden on bottom 80%, 20074

0.093

0.014

0.060

0.116

Average state tax burden, 2007

0.082

0.015

0.042

0.112

Share of total AGI in top 5% of returns, 20073

0.338

0.046

0.278

0.486

Share of total AGI in next 15% of returns, 2007

0.289

0.020

0.221

0.316

Capital gains share of AGI in top 5% of returns, 20073

0.209

0.053

0.126

0.389

0.033

0.008

0.018

0.054

3

4

4

3

3

Capital gains share of AGI in next 15% of returns, 2007

Source notes:
1
U.S. Census Bureau 2007 & 2009.
2
Authors’ calculations (see Table 2, footnote 1).
3
Internal Revenue Service various years and authors’ calculations (see section 3C).
4
Institute for Taxation and Economic Policy 2009.
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Table 2 Change in actual taxes vs. potential revenue exposure: high and low states
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

All states

5 most
progressive
states2

5 most
regressive
states3

5 largest %
decreases in
state taxes4

5 largest %
increases in
state taxes5

8 states with
high mineral
taxes6

Change in total state tax
revenue ($ per return)

−138

−400

232

−782

1031

480

(Standard Deviation)

(582)

Percent change in total state
tax revenue

−3.1

−6.7

1.2

−14.6

17.7

7.9

(Standard Deviation)

(10.3)
−466

−189

−459

−102

−9

1

Potential revenue exposure

−255

(Total state taxes, in $
per return)
(Standard Deviation)

(215)

Progressivity:

0.8

0.98

0.54

0.78

0.77

0.75

0.082

0.084

0.057

0.08

0.071

0.079

Burden on top 5%/Average
burden
Average tax burden

Notes:
1
Defined as the weighted sum of the change in AGI 2007–2009 per federal return in 2007 by segment of the distribution
(i.e., top 5 percent, next 15 percent, bottom 80 percent), weighted by effective tax burden by segment in 2007.
2
California, New Jersey, Oregon, Delaware, Vermont.
3
Washington, South Dakota, Wyoming, Nevada, Florida.
4
Arizona, California, New Mexico, Florida, Connecticut.
5
Wyoming, North Dakota, lowa, Indiana, Montana.
6
Wyoming, West Virginia, Texas, Oklahoma, North Dakota, Montana, Louisiana, New Mexico.

The fifth row of Table 2 shows potential revenue exposure. Mean exposure was
almost twice as large as mean revenue change, while the standard deviation (215) is less
than half that of actual revenue changes19. It is not surprising that actual revenue performance varies more than potential exposure, given that the exposure measure does
not take account of changes in taxes that are heavily exported, including severance
taxes on minerals (mainly oil and gas extraction) and taxes paid by out-of-state
tourists20. Tourism was strongly affected by the Great Recession, while oil and gas
extraction activities increased dramatically due to technological developments in extraction techniques.
Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of actual revenue change against revenue exposure,
for the states mentioned in Table 2, plus New York. Wyoming and North Dakota
are clear outliers, due to the sharp increase in severance tax revenues in these two
states. A comparison of California and New York is also instructive. While both
had similarly large potential revenue exposures, the actual change in California was
about equal to that exposure, whereas the actual change was much smaller in
New York21.
The remaining columns of Table 2 show changes in actual revenue and revenue
exposure for the top and bottom ten percent of states, ranked according to degree of
progressivity (columns 2 and 3), largest increase or decrease in revenues (columns 4
and 5), and importance of severance taxes (column 6). As expected, both actual
revenue decreases and potential revenue exposure are greater for the more progressive
states. As shown in the third row of Table 2, revenues dropped by 6.7 percent for the
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Figure 1 Potential revenue exposure vs. change in taxes, 2007–2009. The change in taxes is per 2007
federal tax return.

most progressive states, but went up by 1.2 percent for the most regressive group. Row
5 shows that potential revenue exposure is also much closer in value to the actual revenue change for the progressive states than for the regressive states and for the states
with large declines than the states with large increases. Revenue exposure is negative
(predicting a decline in tax revenues) for all four groups, whereas actual revenue
changes were positive for the regressive states. This suggests that either policy offsets
or changes in severance taxes and tourist taxes were more important for the regressive
states and states with large increases. Three of the states with the largest revenue
increases – Wyoming, North Dakota, and Montana – were heavily reliant on mineral
taxation.
To summarize, among all states, particularly those with more progressive tax systems,
the revenue exposure measure appears to be a useful way to capture the effects of differential shocks across the income distribution and of tax structure on revenue
changes. Having established this correspondence, we next use simulation analysis to
examine the relative importance of tax structure versus changes in the tax base in
explaining revenue exposure.
Table 3 compares the revenue exposure measure to a set of counterfactuals that
standardize in turn the average tax rate, the degree of progressivity, and the economic
shock, replacing state-specific values of each component by national averages across
the 48 states. The standardization of progressivity substitutes the national average of
the relative burdens on the top 5 percent and the next 15 percent of taxpayers, relative
to the average burden in the state. The standardization of the economic shock replaces
each state’s actual changes in AGI per return for each income slice with the national
average change for that slice.
Not surprisingly, the mean value of revenue exposure changes very little across simulations because the effects of the state-specific factors are averaged out. It is more
informative to look at the standard deviations, which tell which factor most affects the
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Table 3 Alternative measures of potential revenue exposure
Potential change in total
tax revenue per return
Base case1

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

−255

215

−874

214

−251

201

−781

253

Rank correlation
with base case

Counterfactual simulations:
I (National average tax burden)2

.93***

−251

197

−866

219

.95***

III (National average AGI change)4

−262

85

−421

−78

.47***

III-A (National average AGI change-top 5% only)5

−262

126

−516

17

.79***

III-B (National average AGI change-next 15% only)6

−254

196

−874

122

.99***

III-C (National average AGI change-bottom 80% only)7

−255

186

−852

98

.97***

Actual tax change per return

−138

582

−1,128

2,596

.46***

II (National average tax progressivity)

3

***p < .01.
Notes:
1
Potential change in total tax revenues per return, based on state-specific actual change in AGI. state-specific tax progressivity,
and state-specific average tax burden.
2
Simulated potential change in tax revenues, based on state-specific actual change in AGI, state-specific tax progressivity,
but national average of states’ average tax burdens.
3
Simulated potential change in tax revenues, based on state-specific actual change in AGI, national average of states'
tax progressivity, and state-specific average tax burden.
4
Simulated potential change in tax revenues, based on national average of states' change in AGI, state-specific tax
progressivity, and state-specific average tax burden.
5
Simulated potential change in tax revenues, based on national average of states' change in AGI for top 5%, state-specific
tax progressivity, and state-specific average tax burden.
6
Simulated potential change in tax revenues, based on national average of states' change in AGI for next 15%, state-specific
tax progressivity, and state-specific average tax burden.
7
Simulated potential change in tax revenues, based on national average of states' change in AGI for bottom 80%,
state-specific tax progressivity, and state-specific average tax burden.

variance in exposure. The simulations show that imposing a uniform average tax rate
(Simulation I), or uniform progressivity (Simulation II) have very little effect on the
variation in fiscal exposure. However, imposing a uniform economic shock dramatically
reduces the standard deviation (Simulation III). The coefficient of variation goes from
0.84 to 0.32. This result suggests that variation across states in fiscal exposure to the
Great Recession was due primarily to differences in the magnitude of the economic
shock, as opposed to differing rates and structure of taxation.
To get a sense of the extent to which the change in the variance of revenue exposure
under the simulations reflects a reduction in the absolute value of exposure among outliers, versus changes in rank order, the last column of Table 3 shows the Spearman rank
correlation coefficients between revenue exposure and the various simulations. The
large positive coefficients indicate that rank order is largely preserved under the simulations. The coefficient is close to one for the tax structure simulations. Though it is only
half as large under the uniform AGI simulation (Simulation III), the coefficient is still
significant at the one percent level. Thus, replacing the actual AGI changes with national averages reduces exposure among outliers, while still mostly preserving rank
order in state revenue exposure.
To further decompose the economic shock, simulations III-A, III-B, and III-C in
Table 3 replace one at time the actual change in AGI with the national average change
for the top 5 percent (III-A), the next 15 percent (III-B), and the bottom 80 percent
(III-C). The results show that standardizing the top 5 percent (III-A) produces a substantial reduction in the standard deviation (41 percent), while standardizing the other
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parts of the income distribution has little effect. This suggests that variation in the economic shock at the top of the income distribution is the key factor in explaining differences in the revenue exposure of states to the Great Recession. This suggestion is
reinforced by the Spearman correlation coefficients between revenue exposure and the
various simulations. Standardizing AGI change for the next 15 and bottom 80 percent does
not change the ranking of states’ revenue exposure (ρ = +.99 and ρ = +.97, respectively), but
the ranking does change appreciably when AGI change is standardized for the top 5 percent alone (ρ = +.79). Thus, a critical step in our analysis is to explain variations in the
change in AGI among the top 5 percent. We turn next to this analysis.
4. Capital gains, income inequality, and economic shocks

In this section we present a set of regression models to explain the economic shock for
the top 5 and next 15 percent of the AGI distribution as a function of income concentration and capital gains receipt. In the subsequent section we examine the role of
changes in the tax base, together with the initial tax structure, in explaining the
observed change in revenues.
The basic model to explain changes in the tax base by income level in a state is given by
ΔAGIq ¼ a0 þ a1 ShareAGIq þ a2 CapGainsShareq þ a3 Burdenq ;

ð9Þ

where q = top5 denotes the top 5 percent and q = nxt15 denotes the next 15 percent of
the AGI distribution, ΔAGI is the 2007–2009 change in AGI per return, ShareAGI is
the share of total state AGI, CapGainsShare is the share of AGI that consisted of realized capital gains, and Burden is the tax burden, all for the qth slice of the income
distribution in 2007. (We suppress the subscripts indicating state and year to simplify
the expression.)
We are not trying to explain all of the variation in the change in AGI with this
model. Rather, we are interested in how the variation across states in the concentration
of income at the top of the income distribution, and the variation in the share of capital
gains in top incomes, contributed to the variation in the change in AGI at the top.
Since capital gains took a bigger hit in 2007–2009 than other forms of income, we
expect their importance to the upper income groups, together with the share of a state’s
aggregate income that is received by those groups, to be important in explaining the
change in AGI at the top. We include the tax burden to test whether it is correlated
with the change in AGI, controlling for the other two factors.
Estimation results are shown in Table 4. Column (1) shows that these three variables
explain 85 percent of the variation in the income shock to the top 5 percent. Greater
income concentration and a larger share of capital gains in top incomes at the outset of
the recession were each associated with a bigger drop in AGI in the top 5 percent of
the income distribution. It is notable that despite the relatively high correlation between income concentration and the capital gains share in the top 5 percent (ρ = +.66),
both income concentration and capital gains share are statistically significant and economically important. Evaluated at the mean change in AGI, a one percentage-point
increase in the share of AGI in the top 5 percent implies a 7.6 percent greater reduction
in top-5 AGI. For the capital gains share, the comparable change in AGI is 4.5 percent.
These magnitudes indicate the strong relationship between income inequality and
capital gains receipt and the cyclical behavior of a state’s tax base.

Chernick et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2014, 3:3
http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/3

Page 12 of 22

Table 4 Regression models for change in AGI per return by segment of the AGI distribution

Share of top 5% in AGI, 2007
t-statistic
Cap gains share of AGI in top 5% AGI, 2007
t-statistic
Tax burden on top 5%
t-statistic

(1)

(2)

Change in AGI per return,
top 5%

Change in AGI per return,
next 15%

−643475***
[−8.17]
−378969***
[−4.97]
−381995**
[−2.36]

Share of next 15% in AGI, 2007

14802

t-statistic

[0.66]

Cap gains share of AGI in next 15%, 2007

−15821

t-statistic

[−0.29]

Tax burden on next 15%

−24120

t-statistic

[−0.89]

Constant

237904***

−6972

t-statistic

[9.86]

[−0.93]

No. of observations

48

48

Adjusted R-squared

0.847

−0.040

**p < .05, ***p < .01.

Column (1) indicates that, controlling for income concentration and capital gains,
higher effective tax burdens on the top-5 AGI group across states are associated with
greater declines in AGI. This result suggests that high tax burdens at the top may serve
to magnify the actual fiscal effects of the economic shock. The direction of effect is
consistent with our prior analysis of fiscal exposure, in which we found that replacing
actual progressivity with national average progressivity, while keeping average tax burdens at their 2007 actual state levels, reduced the variation in exposure. However, the
magnitude of the effect is small in both types of analysis. In the fiscal exposure analysis
in Table 3, the standard deviation is reduced by 8.4 percent when we standardize progressivity; while in the regression analysis in Table 4, column (1), the proportion of the
variation explained by the regression goes from .832 to .847 when the tax burden is
added to the model (version without burden not shown).
The model explains 85 percent of the interstate variation in the income shock for the
top 5 percent, but none of it for the next 15 percent (column 2). This suggests that the
change in the tax base below the top 5 percent depends more on state-specific recessionary shocks to earnings and spending, as opposed to the national shock to capital
gains realizations. Neither income concentration nor the capital-gains share in the next
15 percent has a significant effect. The insignificance of capital gains is no doubt
because the capital-gains share of their income is so small (only 3 percent on average).
Recall from Section 3D that the single most important factor in explaining interstate
variation in revenue exposure is the change in AGI among the top 5 percent of the AGI
distribution. As shown in Table 4, the variation in top-5 AGI change is almost completely
explained by differences in income concentration and capital gains receipt. Hence, imposing a uniform AGI change for the top 5 percent (as in Table 3, simulation III-A) is
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approximately equivalent to assuming a uniform concentration of income in the top 5 percent across states, and a uniform share of capital gains in the income of the top 5 percent.
Having examined differential changes in AGI across states, in the next section of the paper
we examine the effect of these differentials on actual changes in tax revenues.
5. Actual revenue changes
A. Model

In this section we model the relationship between the change in tax revenue and the
key factors in revenue exposure – tax burdens and changes in AGI by slices of the
income distribution – in progressively less restrictive ways. First, we combine the
factors into a single measure of exposure – a sum of products, as shown in equation (7).
Then, in order to analyze the effect of each factor in each product separately, we enter
them in a multivariate linear model. Finally, we allow for interactions between the tax
burden and change in AGI within each income slice.
The dependent variable in this analysis is the actual 2007–2009 change in state tax
revenues per 2007 return, while the independent variables are the components of
revenue exposure. The least restrictive specification is given by

ð10Þ
ΔRevenuej ¼ a0 þ Σ q a1 ⋅ ΔAGIqj þ a2 ⋅ Burdenqj þ a3 ⋅ ΔAGIqj ⋅ Burdenqj
In (10), j indexes the 48 contiguous states, while q indexes the three slices of the AGI
distribution: the top 5 percent, the next 15 percent, and the bottom 80 percent. The
coefficients on ΔAGI are expected to be positive, while the coefficients on the tax
burden are expected to be negative. Coefficients on the interaction terms are expected
to be positive; that is, the revenue impact of an economic shock at a given income level
is expected to be greater, the higher the tax burden imposed at that income level.
The model in (10) does not include all of the variables that are related to the change
in state tax revenue, because it is intended to estimate the effects of the factors in
revenue exposure. The specification excludes policy responses – i.e., changes to tax
rates or bases – because we lack state-specific data on these changes. Moreover, the
revenue exposure measure is able to capture only part of the change in revenue from
taxes with a strong export component, because we lack reliable estimates of exporting
coefficients22. Hence the regression is estimating the effect of fiscal exposure on revenue
changes, including policy responses and export-related changes. Both of these factors are
reflected in the error term. If these omitted factors are systematically more positive in states
with greater potential revenue exposure, then negative estimates of the effect of revenue
exposure on actual revenue changes may be biased toward zero23.
To get a sense of whether this is a serious problem – whether the offsets from policy
and/or export are correlated with revenue exposure – we took the difference between
actual tax changes and revenue exposure, and examined its correlation with the regressors
in (10). None of the regressors for the top 5 percent was correlated with the difference at
conventional significance levels24. This suggests that the potential bias from correlation of
the error term with the regressors in (10) is unlikely to be very severe.
B. Regression results

Table 5 presents the analysis of the change in tax revenues. Model (1) is the most
restrictive specification, including only the measure of potential revenue exposure as
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Table 5 Regression models for change in total tax revenue per return
Variable

(2)

(3)

Change in AGI per return, top 5%

−0.001

−0.020***

t-statistic

[−0.69]

[−5.10]

Change in AGI per return, next 15%

0.092**

0.575***

[2.29]

[3.34]

Potential Revenue Exposure
t-statistic

(1)
1.015***
[2.74]

t-statistic
Change in AGI per return, bottom 80%

0.076

0.403

t-statistic

[0.54]

[0.43]

Tax burden on top 5%

−17077

16277

t-statistic

[−1.35]

[1.41]

Tax burden on next 15%

26227

−9935

t-statistic
Tax burden on next 80%
t-statistic

[1.30]

[−0.50]

−23143*

−16339

[−1.90]

[−1.38]

Change in AGI * Burden, top 5%

0.296***

t-statistic

[5.00]
−6.116***

Change in AGI * Burden, next 15%
t-statistic

[−3.11]

Change in AGI * Burden, bottom 80%

−3.114

t-statistic

[−0.34]

Constant

121

1217*

1181

t-statistic

[0.69]

[0.99]

[1.98]

No. of observations

48

48

48

Adjusted R-squared

0.122

0.247

0.573

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.

defined in (7) above. The results show a one-for-one relationship between potential
exposure and the actual change in revenues, on average. However, potential revenue
exposure is able to explain only a small portion of the interstate variation in revenue
changes (adjusted R2 = 0.12). This result is reflected in Figure 1, which shows the relationship between these variables for states that are outliers in terms of progressivity or
the magnitude of revenue changes.
The limited explanatory power of the fiscal exposure measure could reflect the possibility that changes in AGI and tax burdens by income level, reflecting both income and
consumption taxes, do not adequately capture the transmission mechanism from recessionary shocks to revenue outcomes. Alternatively, the summary measure of revenue
exposure may impose unwarranted restrictions on the effects of its individual components. Given the change in AGI in a particular slice of the income distribution, model
(1) of Table 5 implies that a ten percent difference across states in the effective tax rate
on that slice (e.g., from 5 to 5.5 percent) must result in a ten percent difference in the
change in tax revenues generated from that slice (e.g., from -$100 to -$110 per return).
Models (2) and (3) of Table 5 successively relax these restrictions. Model (2) includes
the various factors as separate covariates. In this specification the only AGI change that
has a significant effect on revenue change is in the 80th-95th percentiles. Moreover, tax
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burdens on the top 20 percent of the distribution are insignificant, while the burden on
the bottom 80 percent has a negative effect, which is significant at the 10 percent level.
The explanatory power of the regression, while greater than in model (1), is still weak.
Model (3) allows for interaction effects between tax burdens and changes in the
tax base. This more than doubles the overall explanatory power of the regressions
(from .25 to .57). The interaction terms reveal that the effect on revenue change of the
tax burden on the top 5 percent depends on the magnitude of the decrease in the base.
A higher tax rate is associated with a larger decrease (or smaller gain) in tax revenues
for the 36 states with drops in AGI for the top 5 percent of $55,000 or more. The results for these states are consistent with the hypothesis that the higher the top rate, the
greater the fiscal shock that results from an income shock. However, among the 12
states with a decrease in income for the top 5 percent of less than $55,000, the higher
the top tax rate, the smaller the decrease (or the larger the gain) in revenue25. Thus, for
states whose income shock was below this threshold, a higher tax rate at the top did
not increase the fiscal risk from the Great Recession.
Conversely, the revenue effect of an income shock to the top of the income distribution is conditioned by the initial tax burden. For the 24 states with burdens on the top
5 percent of 6.9 percent or more, a larger negative income shock at the top led to a
greater decrease (or smaller gain) in revenue. But among the other 24 states, which had
burdens on the top 5 percent of less than 6.9 percent, a larger negative income shock
to this top group led to a smaller loss (or bigger gain) in revenue.
It is widely claimed that more progressive states, because they rely more heavily on
the personal income tax, face more volatility in their revenue streams over the business
cycle26. Consistent with this claim, equation (3) in Table 5 indicates that at the mean
change in top-5 AGI (-$84,000), a higher tax burden is associated with a larger decrease
in revenues. Moreover, when we put together the effects of tax structure and base shock,
the recession’s effect on state revenues was substantially magnified in those states with
both high tax burdens and large income shocks at the top of the income distribution.
The key result from our research is that empirically, in contrast to this general view,
the progressivity-volatility link is weak. Only three states – California, New York, and
New Jersey – had both high tax rates on the top 5 percent and large negative income
shocks27. The large income shocks in these three states are related to the very high
degree of income concentration and, in two of the states, the high relative importance
of capital gains28. To be sure, these are important states, raising 28 percent of all state
tax revenues in 200729. No other state was even in the top quartile of both effects.
Among all states, the simple correlation between the tax burden and change in AGI for
the top 5 percent is + .165, the positive sign indicating that states with larger negative
shocks to top incomes tended to have smaller tax burdens on this group, on average.
Excluding California, New York, and New Jersey, the mean burden on the top 5 percent for the other 15 states with larger-than-average drops in their AGI is .055, whereas
the national average is .066.
The very low correlation between the tax burdens and income shocks to the top 5
percent reflects the negative correlation between the tax burden and the principal
determinants of the change in AGI at the top: income concentration (ρ = -.24) and capital
gains receipt (ρ = -.47). As noted in Section 4, these variables explain most of the variation
in AGI change for the top 5 percent.
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The revenue effect of a higher tax burden on the 80th-95th percentiles is the opposite
of the effect for the top 5 percent. The negative coefficient on the interaction term
(Table 5, column 3, row 9) implies that the greater the decrease in AGI, the smaller the
decrease (or the larger the increase) in revenue corresponding to a higher tax rate on the
next 15 percent. Evaluated at the mean change in AGI for this group (-$5,257 per return),
states with higher tax burdens on the 80th-95th percentiles had smaller decreases in tax
revenue, or actual increases30. However, because the tax burden is virtually uncorrelated
with the change in AGI for the next 15 percent (ρ = -0.112, p-value = .45), the overall effect
of higher next-15 tax burdens on revenue changes is muted.
The ITEP analysis indicates a very strong positive correlation between the burdens
on adjacent segments of the income distribution. The correlation between the burdens
on the top 5 percent and the next 15 percent is .92. This strong correlation means that
higher burdens on the next 15 percent in some states than others are not an indication
of greater tax regressivity at the top of the income distribution. Hence, the revenuedampening effect of higher burdens on the next 15 percent cannot be interpreted as an
effect of regressivity on tax volatility. We suspect that the result is related to the very
weak correlation between next-15 burdens and changes in AGI.
The results from model (3) of Table 5 suggest that the overall relationship between
tax progressivity and revenue volatility is weak and even counterintuitive. Higher tax
burdens at the very top of the income distribution do increase the potential fiscal risk
from recession in those states where income at the top is very volatile. However, empirically the actual effect is small on average, because most states with high exposure at
the top do not impose high tax burdens on that group. The three states with the highest
burdens on the top 5 percent – California, New York, and New Jersey – also had very
large negative income shocks, due to the concentration of income and – in California and
New York – large shares of capital gains at the top; but they are exceptional cases. Most
states with large income shocks to the top 5 percent have below-average tax burdens on
this group, which reduces the impact on tax revenues. Moreover, in the next 15 percent of
the distribution, higher tax burdens are associated with reduced revenue volatility at the
mean income shock. Thus higher burdens in the top 20 percent of the income distribution,
which are associated with a less regressive tax structure, did not increase overall tax
volatility during the Great Recession.

6. Conclusion
The impact of the Great Recession on state tax revenues has been severe, with the
depth and persistence of the decline greater than any other downturn in the post-war
period. The innovation of this paper is to analyze this downturn, not in terms of the
behavior of individual taxes, but in terms of the distribution of income and of tax burdens.
This approach allows us to determine the extent to which the revenue decline is influenced
by income inequality and volatility, compared with the progressivity of state tax structure.
We hypothesized that more progressive states are more vulnerable to revenue losses in
economic downturns, and that this greater vulnerability has been amplified by secular
changes in the income distribution.
To apply these hypotheses to the Great Recession, we use estimates of state-specific
tax burdens and changes in AGI by slice of the income distribution to construct a
measure of potential revenue exposure for each state, and examine how much the
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dispersion in this measure is affected by the economic shock, tax progressivity, and
average tax burdens. This exercise suggests that the dominant factor in explaining the
variation in potential revenue exposure is the economic shock to the tax base in a state,
particularly among the top 5 percent of filing units, as opposed to variations in tax
burdens or progressivity.
We then analyze the determinants of the economic shock. We find that the both the
concentration of income and the share of capital gains in the income of high-income
taxpayers are important determinants of the economic shock to states. Evaluated at the
mean, a one percentage-point increase in income concentration leads to a 7.7 percent
greater decrease in AGI. A one standard-deviation increase (about five percentage
points) leads to a 38 percent increase in the economic shock. A one standard-deviation
increase in the capital-gains share (about five percentage points) leads to a 23 percent
increase. Given the range across states, these effects are large enough to have a significant effect on the volatility of the tax base, and potentially on the volatility of revenues.
We also estimate a multiple regression model of actual revenue changes over the
recessionary period 2007–2009, as a function of the components of revenue exposure
and their interactions. Specified as a single variable, potential revenue exposure
explains only a small portion of the variation in actual changes. However, when we
decompose exposure into its components and include interaction terms, more than half
of the variation in actual revenue change is explained. We find that both the direction
and the magnitude of their effects depend on interactions between the tax burden and
the AGI change.
The revenue effect of an income shock to the top of the income distribution is conditioned by the initial tax burden. In the Great Recession the average effect of differences
in tax progressivity was small. For states with above-median tax burdens, a larger
income shock led to a greater decrease in revenue; but for the remaining states, a
higher tax burden was associated with a smaller decrease in revenues. Hence, while
states with a high degree of income concentration and/or dependence on capital gains
are especially vulnerable to volatility in the tax base, the resulting large changes in AGI
at the top of the income distribution do not necessarily translate into sharper drops in
tax revenue. This is because income volatility and tax progressivity are weakly correlated across U.S. states. Hence, with a few important exceptions, the potential revenue
exposure implied by large drops in the top end of the income-tax base tends not to be
reinforced by high effective tax rates at the top.
These findings hold despite the fact that the most progressive states did on average
tend to have larger tax declines than the most regressive states. However, there are also
some notable counterexamples. For example, Florida and Nevada suffered among the
largest reductions in state tax revenues, both in absolute and percentage terms, despite
highly regressive tax systems. These states were subject to high tax-base volatility at the
top, due to very unequal income distributions and high capital gains receipts. Though
the lack of an income tax in both of these states insulated them from the direct effects
of declines in capital-gains income, this volatility-reducing effect was outweighed by
the decline in tourism and construction-related consumption taxes.
The impact of the recession on state tax revenues operates through two different
channels. The first is through the national impact of the sharp decline in stock market
valuations, and the attendant collapse in realized capital gains. State tax bases are
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affected by this component in proportion to their pre-recession reliance on capital
gains income, which in turn is associated with the degree of income concentration. In a
small number of states, progressive tax structures amplified the fiscal impact of large
drops in capital gains income. However, our regression results suggest that in a larger
group of states, tax structures served to dampen the revenue impact of the change in
capital gains.
The second channel through which the national recession impacts state tax revenues
is through its differential effect on output and employment by state. This channel has a
greater impact on incomes below the top 5 percent of the distribution than in the top 5
percent. Our findings for this group are surprising. Higher tax burdens on the 80th to
95th percentiles of their income distributions, which are characteristic of more progressive state tax systems, tended to mitigate rather than exacerbate recession-induced
declines in tax revenues.
Revenue volatility is often presented as an argument against using more progressive
income tax policy to address rising income inequality. Our analysis of the effects on
state tax revenues of the Great Recession does not support this argument. In this very
steep downturn, regressive taxation failed to insulate states from revenue shocks, while
for most states greater tax progressivity did not amplify revenue shocks. We emphasize
that our findings are based on a single, albeit very severe, cyclical downturn. However,
the methods developed in this paper can and should be applied to the analysis of other
recessions, to determine the generalizability of our findings.

Endnotes
1
In real terms, state tax revenues in 2012 were still 5 percent lower than in 2008. In
the 2001 recession, nominal tax revenues declined for only one year, showing a 4.3 percent drop from 2001 to 2002. By 2004, three years after the onset of the recession,
nominal revenues were 5.7 percent higher than the previous peak in 2001. A year later,
in 2005, tax revenues were 16.3 percent higher than in the year of the recession. In the
double-dip recession of 1980–1982, state tax revenues continued to grow in nominal
terms throughout the recession and its aftermath. By 1985, five years after the onset of
the first of the double-dip recessions (and three years after the official end of the
second), state tax collections were up 57.4 percent.
2
Through 2011, about 40 percent of the decline in state revenues was offset by
increased federal assistance under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009 (ARRA). Nearly all of the ARRA funds for fiscal relief to states were scheduled to
be spent by June of 2011.
3
Hawaii and Alaska are excluded from the analysis because these states, by
virtue of their geographic separation from the others, are not subject to the same
pressure of fiscal competition as the other states, and because both have fiscal structures
that are very different from the other states. Almost all of Alaska’s tax revenues come from
severance taxes on oil, while Hawaii has a disproportional reliance on state versus local
taxation.
4
Dye (2004) discusses the fact that the decline in state tax revenues in the 2001 recession was very large relative to the magnitude of the economic shock. He attributes the
greater volatility of state tax revenues to the disproportionate growth in capital gains
and other non-wage income in the late 1990s. Moreover, between 1993 and 2010,
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average real family income grew by 58 percent for the top one percent of families,
versus 6.4 percent for the other 99 percent of families (Saez 2012).
5
In 2007, 38 percent of capital-gains realizations were received by the top one tenth
of one percent of taxpayers (Lurie and Pearce 2012).
6
Between 2007 and 2009, average real family income fell by 17 percent while real income
for the top percentile fell by 36 percent (Saez 2012). Aggregate capital-gains realizations
plummeted from $913 billion in 2007 to $48 billion in 2009 (Lurie and Pearce 2012).
7
A similarly sharp change in realizations occurred in the 2001 recession, dropping
from $700 billion in 2000 to $126 billion in 2002 (Lurie and Pearce 2012).
8
The data source and methodology for capital-gains shares is described below in
Section 3C.
9
Incidence assumptions and methodology used to compute tax burdens are discussed
in Section 3C.
10
The structure of the income tax varies widely across states. Of the 41 states that
use broad-based income taxation, 19 states have either a flat rate or tax most income at
a single rate. For the rest of the income-tax states, there is considerable variation in
both the top rate and the degree of graduation (Dye 2004).
11
Dietz et al. (2010) argue that reliance on more cyclically sensitive taxes has
increased the budgetary exposure of particular states to cyclical economic fluctuations.
Boyd (2010) makes a similar point in terms of the recovery from the Great Recession.
12
For example, New York reduced its exemption for clothing from its sales tax base,
while Michigan increased the effective income tax rate on low-income taxpayers by
reducing the size of the state supplement to the federal Earned Income Tax Credit. As
of July 2009, 30 states had increased at least one state tax rate, as compared to their
pre-recession level (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2010).
13
The ITEP model breaks the top quintile of tax burdens into the top one percent,
the next four percent, and the next 15 percent.
14
While for most states this omission makes little difference, for those few states with
large revenues from mineral taxation (severance taxes) or high levels of tourism, the
disparity between average tax burdens as measured by the ITEP and tax collections as
a fraction of state personal income could be substantial.
15
Linear interpolation implicitly assumes that the AGI and capital gains amounts are
uniformly distributed within an AGI bracket. However, we infer from the overall shapes
of the AGI and capital gains distributions that AGI is concentrated at the lower end
and capital gains at the upper end of each bracket. Therefore, linear interpolation overstates AGI and understates capital gains in the top 5 percent of returns, and therefore
understates the capital-gains share of AGI in that part of the income distribution.
Unfortunately, the published IRS data are in broad income brackets, which do not
permit a more refined interpolation.
16
In 2007 and 2009 fewer than 5 percent of returns were in the top AGI bracket
($200,000 or above) in every state but two (New Jersey, with 5.1 percent in 2007 and
Connecticut, with 5.1 percent in 2009). We treat the top AGI bracket as equivalent to
the top 5 percent in New Jersey in 2007 and Connecticut in 2009.
17
Actual state tax revenues come from U.S. Census Bureau, various years.
18
The largest percentage decline in state revenue was in Arizona (−23 percent), while
the largest increase was in Wyoming (+36 percent). The state at the 10th percentile of
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actual changes in revenue per return had a decline of 12.6 percent, while the state at
the 90th percentile had an increase of 24 percent.
19
The state at the 10th percentile of revenue exposure, California, was at risk for a
revenue decrease of $617 per return, while at the 90th percentile West Virginia was at
risk for a $74 increase.
20
The Census of Governments defines severance taxes as “Taxes imposed distinctively
on removal of natural products (e.g. oil, gas, other minerals, timber, fish, etc.) from land
or water and measured by value or quantity of products removed or sold”.
21
The difference between the two states is that New York, unlike California, implemented an important policy offset in this period, raising the top marginal income tax
rate for taxable income exceeding $200,000 (single filers). Starting on January 1, 2009,
marginal tax rates were set at 7.85 percent for taxable income exceeding $300,000
(married filing jointly), and 8.97 percent for income exceeding $500,000. Prior rates
were 6.85 percent for taxable income exceeding $40,000 (Tax Foundation, 2013). It is worth
noting that the standard deviation of revenue exposure for the income tax alone is much
closer to the standard deviation of actual income tax revenues than is the case for all taxes.
22
States are able to export severance taxes because mineral extractions are typically
sold on national or international markets. For states that depend heavily on tourism,
taxes on consumption are likely to have a higher than average export component. To
the extent that changes in extraction activity or tourism are translated into changes in
domestic income, the effects will be at least partially captured by changes in the tax
base (AGI). Hence, at least some portion of the revenue impact of windfall gains or
losses in severance taxes or tourism-related revenues will be captured by the model.
23
Evidence for such an offset comes from Poterba (1994) who finds that in the 1988–
1992 period offsetting state tax responses to unexpected negative deficit shocks were
proportional to the magnitude of the shock. Poterba finds that there is an increase in
states taxes after two years approximately equal to the shock.
24
At the ten percent level of significance, changes in top 5 percent AGI were positively correlated (Pearson correlation coefficient) with the offset, while changes in the
next 15 percent were negatively correlated with it.
25
Controlling for the average tax burden in a state and the burdens on the other percentiles, the effect on revenue of a 100 percentage-point increase in the tax burden (i.
e., from 0 to 1) on the top 5 percent equals (16277 + .296∙ΔAGItop5). Setting this expression equal to zero implies the results given in the text.
26
A typical example of this claim is given by the Tax Foundation (2013), in their response to the Institute for Taxation and Economic Policy release of their 2013 distributional analysis for states (ITEP 2013).
27
These three states had tax burdens on the top 5 percent which were the highest
among all states, and the fourth, seventh, and eighth largest decreases in top-5 AGI.
28
In 2007, the shares of AGI received by the top 5 percent in New York, California,
and New Jersey were .47, .39, and .38 respectively, as compared to the mean share
of .34. Capital-gains shares of income in the top 5 percent in New York and California
were .26 and .24, versus a national average of .21. However, New Jersey’s capital-gains
share (.17) was actually lower than the national average.
To get a sense of the potential impact of these factors on actual revenue change in
California, the regression coefficients in column (1) in Table 4 imply that if California

Page 20 of 22

Chernick et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2014, 3:3
http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/3

were to have national average income concentration and capital gains receipt, its AGI
reduction in the top 5 percent would have gone from $150,043 to $104,834, or about a
30 percent smaller income shock. Applying this smaller change to the revenue coefficients from equation (3) in Table 5, the impact on predicted revenues via the top 5
percent would in turn have been reduced by $376 (from -$1249 to -$873), or about 30
percent. This predicted change is a little less than half of the actual reduction in tax
revenues in California ($376/$780). If the capital-gains share in the top 5 percent were
set equal to the national average, but income concentration in California were
unchanged, the smaller top 5 percent AGI change would have cut California’s revenue
loss by only 13 percent ($101/$780) .
29
Note however that in one of the three high-exposure states, New York, tax revenues
actually increased. This is because the state increased the top marginal tax rates, thus
offsetting its large potential revenue exposure.
30
From column (3) of Table 5, the effect of a one-unit increase in Burdennxt15 is given
by (−9935 - 6.116∙ΔAGInxt15). Setting this term to zero implies that if the decrease in
AGI for the 80th-95th percentiles is larger than $1625, a higher tax burden on the next
15 percent is associated with a smaller reduction in state tax revenues, ceteris paribus.
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